

MISCELLANEA CRITICA

R. D. DAWE

Bacchylides 5. 136–39:

ταῦτ' οὐκ ἐπιλεξαμένα
Θεστίου κούρα δαΐφρων
μάτηρ κακόποτμος ἐμοί
βούλευσεν ὄλεθρον ἀτάρβακτος γυνά.

Das bedachte nicht des Thestios unbarmherzige Tochter, meine Mutter, die ein schlimmes Geschick mir schuf; sie sann auf meinen Untergang, die Frau, die nichts zittern macht.—H. Maehler, *Bacchylides: Lieder und Fragmente*

While not insisting that Greek poets should never be permitted to exhibit a spark of originality, I do wish to draw attention to the fact that normal poetic technique would call for κακόποτμον, agreeing with ὄλεθρον, the epithet itself containing a near synonym of the noun with which it agrees. This familiar phenomenon is especially characteristic of kako- adjectives. From the special lexica to the tragedians one culls at a moment's notice: κακόποτμοι τύχαι (Aesch. *Ag.* 1136); κακόφρων with reference to μέριμνα (*Ag.* 100); κακοφάτιδα βοάν, κακομέλετον ἰάν (*Pers.* 936); from Sophocles, λόγος κακόθρους (*Aj.* 138), κακόβουλος φροντίς (frag. 592. 2–3), and *Philoctetes* 692: here the influence of the stereotype is so strong that we find οὐδέ τιν' ἐγγώρων κακογείτονα, where the sense is not “an evil neighbor” but “a neighbor to stand by him in misfortune.” Euripides has κακοτυχεῖς πότμοι (*Hipp.* 669), κακόφρων παράνοια (*Or.* 824), κακογλώσσου βοῆς (*Hec.* 661), and λέσχας κακοστόμους (*IA* 1001). Indeed, Maehler's “die ein schlimmes Geschick mir schuf” translates the text as if it did read κακόποτμον, and the fresh beginning he has to make with “sie sann auf meinen Untergang” is revealing. Maehler sees here a climax: δαΐφρων → κακόποτμος → ἀτάρβακτος γυνά. A better defense would be that κούρα has its own adjective δαΐφρων; similarly, γυνά has ἀτάρβακτος; and therefore one might expect μάτηρ to have an adjective agreeing with it. But if we read κακόποτμον, δαΐφρων can either go with both κούρα and μάτηρ (“unbarmherzige Tochter, meine Mutter”) or, perhaps better, modify μάτηρ alone, for κούρα already has Θεστίου by way of accompaniment,

I should like to acknowledge the helpful criticisms of D. Kovacs on some of the suggestions put forward in this paper.

[©1988 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved]

0009-837X/88/8302-0001\$01.00

and the δαίφρων quality of Althaea manifested itself in her capacity as mother, not daughter. It was after all not Meleager's mother who constituted his πότμος, but the firebrand with which Fate had determined his life to be coterminous, as the poem immediately goes on to state. "My ill-starred mother" is Jebb's translation here; but the adjective is then perfunctory in the extreme. Any ill-starring in this context must relate to the doomed hero, as it relates to the doomed heroine at Euripides *Helena* 694. Finally, I would not wish to exclude the idea that κακόποτμος also looks to the future: "that proved to be κακός." Similarly predicative is the usage at Bacchylides 16. 24–25 πολύδακρυν ὕφανε μῆτιν ἐπίφρον' (on this and other passages, see the remarks in E. Williger, *Sprachliche Untersuchungen zu den Komposita der griechischen Dichter des 5. Jahrhunderts*, Forschungen zur griechischen und lateinischen Grammatik, Heft 8 [Göttingen, 1928], p. 18).

Aeschylus *Supplices* 335–39:

ΧΟ. ὥς μὴ γένωμαι δμοῖς Αἰγύπτου γένει.
 ΒΑ. πότρεα κατ' ἔχθραν, ἢ τὸ μὴ θέμις λέγεις;
 ΧΟ. τίς δ' ἂν φίλους ὀνοῖτο τοὺς κεκτημένους;
 ΒΑ. σθένος μὲν οὕτως μείζον αὖξεται βροτοῖς.
 ΧΟ. καὶ δυστυχούντων γ' εὐμαρῆς ἀπαλλαγῇ.

337 ὀνοῖτο ME et ΣΜ 339 -τυχούντων recc.:
 -όντων ME γ' de Tournebou: om. M^{ac}: τ' M^{pc}E

All students of Aeschylus will recognize this as possibly the most crucial passage in the whole of *Supplices* for the question whether the suppliant girls are against men in general or only against marriage with their cousins in particular. A. F. Garvie takes up the question on page 221 of his book, and H. Friis Johansen and E. W. Whittle discuss it on page 34 of the introduction to their three-volume commentary.¹ They evaluate lines 8, 37–39, and 224–29 in a way that enables them to say in their note on 336 that "there has so far been no reference [sc. to cousin-marriage] in the play." I can only say that I disagree with their evaluation and would certainly assume that τὸ μὴ θέμις in 336 was intended to provide the contrast between hatred—whether of men in general or cousins in particular—and the incestuous nature of a marriage ὧν θέμις εἶργει (37). With that reservation in mind let us consider what these two commentators have to say about 336 in general. They toy with the idea of taking the line to mean "are you speaking out of hatred, or are you speaking of unrighteousness?" They then reject this interpretation in favor of "Is it out of hatred <that you supplicate> or are you speaking of unrighteousness?" Their reason for doing so is that φιλοῦς' in 337 shows the former view to be untenable. I confess that I would not understand this argument even if Marckscheffel's emendation was cer-

1. Garvie, *Aeschylus' "Supplices": Play and Trilogy* (Cambridge, 1969); Friis Johansen and Whittle, eds., *Aeschylus: "The Suppliants,"* 3 vols. (Copenhagen, 1980).

tainly right. The two commentators correctly observe that κατὰ plus accusative “never *denotes* cause, however natural it may be to translate it loosely as ‘because of’ in certain combinations.” But “out of hatred” is as clear a case of “denoting cause” as one can get. Clumsy though the phraseology is, for the purposes of penetrating to the poet’s meaning we should cling to the underlying idea in κατὰ of “along the lines of” or “in terms of.”

Now, to the question “Are you speaking in terms of personal hostility, or referring to something that divine authority would not sanction?” (I apologize for the long-winded pomposity of my translation) the chorus reply with a line that ranks high among the Aeschylean inscrutables. I refer the reader to Friis Johansen and Whittle for a review of the major possibilities. Attention has focused mainly on the verb: should it be ὦνοῖτο or ὄνοῖτο or οἶοῖτο? As for the word before it, most scholars confine themselves to choosing between φίλους or φιλοῦς’—which on the face of it is not unreasonable, since it seems to answer the question raised by the use of κατ’ ἔχθραν. The scholium gives no guidance, having only κατ’ ἔχθραν δηλονότι· τίς γὰρ τοὺς ἄνδρας δέσποτας ὦνοῖτο; φίλους then remains unglossed; and for what it is worth, the scholium supports M in reading ὦνοῖτο. (Why our two commentators say ὄνοῖτο would produce “far better sense” in this scholium I do not know; for myself I would not be able to translate τίς γὰρ τοὺς ἄνδρας δέσποτας ὄνοῖτο;)

It has long been noted that Euripides *Medea* 232–34 is a remarkably similar passage:

ἄς πρῶτα μὲν δεῖ χρημάτων ὑπερβολῇ
πόσιν πρίασθαι, δεσπότην τε σώματος
λαβεῖν·

The relevance of the parallel is even greater than this excerpt reveals, for a few lines later on it touches on ἀπαλλαγαί (236; cf. our 339). *Medea* has spoken not simply out of passion: γιγνώσκω καλῶς is a phrase from 228, and γνώμην ἔχει one from 230. It is my belief that this note is struck also in our passage, and I suggest that for φίλους or φιλοῦς’ we should read instead φρονοῦς’. The chorus do not reply to the King’s question in the either/or terms in which he has put it; instead they sidestep it, or perhaps I should say render it irrelevant, by replying “who in her right mind would lay out good money to acquire someone as her lord and master?” Our two commentators would probably reply to this idea that it is simply inapplicable to the particular circumstances of the case, since “Danaus and his daughters are needy exiles” and there is “not the slightest mention . . . of the specific topic of male enrichment through marriage.” This is true, but I believe the debate here is being conducted in general terms and will continue to be so in the next two lines. To the more technical objection that φρονοῦς’ is not the likeliest word in the world to be corrupted into φίλους, I reply (a) that κατ’ ἔχθραν could predispose the mind of a scribe to see φίλους where no φίλους should

be, and (b) that no one should cast the first stone until he has looked at the apparatus criticus to verse 74.

Just as the chorus sidestep the King's pointed question, so he too sidesteps their equally pointed rejoinder. But one can see precisely how he does it only if one examines his choice of words. "Yet this is the way that power grows for mortals" is how Friis Johansen translated the line in his volume of 1970.² If we ask what kind of power we are talking about, the answer given by the commentary of 1980 is the power of the strong (men) over the weak (women). This is described as "a utilitarian reason advanced by Pelasgus." But the last thing we want is such a reason to be advanced by Pelasgus; it simply strengthens the Danaids' case. The μέν in 338 strongly implies that Pelasgus is pointing out at any rate one good feature of marriage that might appeal to the Danaids, and this implication will remain whether or not one puts a lacuna before this verse, as Friis Johansen and Whittle do, following Wilamowitz. Second, we have to ask why in a context allegedly weighing the advantages of the male sex against the female we find, of all possible words, not ἀνδράσι, nor even some general synonym for "men," but βροτοῖς, "mortals" (as Friis Johansen had rightly translated it). Third, there is a more recherché point. It relates to the meaning of δυστυχούντων and to the question whether or not it is to be construed with ἀπαλλαγῇ. It seems to me certain that δυστυχούντων is not some vague and scarcely paralleled one-word genitive absolute, "when things go badly,"³ least of all in a sentence containing ἀπαλλαγῇ, a word that in tragedy always has a dependent genitive with it except at Euripides *Medea* 236 (the passage cited in this note) and 1375. We have then divorce from, or between, δυστυχούντων. This word is not used because Aeschylus could not think of a better one. It means "if they do not have children." This quite specific meaning occurs at Sophocles *Oedipus Tyrannus* 262 and Euripides *Andromache* 713. It is a euphemism like the English "their union was not blessed"—and one can see how admirably βροτοῖς fits into such a context, too.

To clarify my interpretation of this section let me conclude by offering a sort of modern scholiastic translation-cum-paraphrase:

Chorus To avoid becoming a slave to Aegyptus' children.

King Are your remarks by way of expressing hostility, or are you speaking of the taboo element?

Chorus Who in her right mind would lay out good money to acquire someone as her lord and master?

King Well, that's the way the human race goes from strength to strength.

Chorus Yes, and if you don't produce children you're divorced before you know it.

King (recognizing that he has lost the general religious, moral, philosophical, and

2. *"The Suppliants,"* vol. 1: *The Text* (Copenhagen, 1970).

3. Eur. *Alc.* 88 (πεπραγμένων) and *Andr.* 998 (τελουμένων) use colorless words by comparison. Aesch. *Sept.* 274 ἐδ' ξυντυχόντων is the best of the parallels offered by Hutchinson in his note on *Sept.* 247.

sociological argument, and returning to the specifics of the immediate situation) How then may I conduct myself toward you in a way that you would regard as pious?

Aeschylus *Agamemnon* 104–9:

κύριός εἰμι θροεῖν ὄδιον κράτος αἴσιον ἀνδρῶν
ἐκτελέων· ἔτι γὰρ θεόθεν καταπνεῖει
πεῖθω, μολπὰν ἀλκὰν σύμφυτος αἰών·
ὅπως Ἀχαιῶν δῖθρονον κράτος, κτλ.

The reader should consult the standard commentaries and review the immense quantity of suggestions recorded in Wecklein's *Appendix* and my own *Repertory*.⁴ If at the end of that exercise he is still dissatisfied, he may like to consider the following proposal for ameliorating one of the difficulties: μολπᾶι δ' ἄρκεῖ σύμφυτος αἰών. The chorus at lines 72–82 have shown themselves acutely aware of their age, and they touch on this theme again now. The expression σύμφυτος αἰών means "I," or rather "I, at my age." The subjectivity of "I" is replaced by something else, as if the speaker were looking at himself from an external standpoint. (Some other examples of this clearly recognizable stereotype are listed in my note on Soph. *OT* 1082–83; Soph. *Aj.* 645 is especially relevant.) We may dismiss from our minds any idea that σύμφυτος αἰών means "my age is suited to"; and why Denniston and Page cite Plato *Laws* 884B αὐδρία . . . τισὶ τόποις σύμφυτος ("the natural dryness of the soil in some places") or Aristotle *De anima* 420a ἀκοῇ δὲ συμφυῆς ἀήρ (or ἀκοῇ δὲ συμφυῆς ἀέρι), as if "suited to" were a possible translation in either place, I have no idea. The choral speaker is a γέρων αἰτιδός (Eur. *HF* 678 and 692; possibly also 110). Like the bard in the *Odyssey* (*Od.* 22. 347), the chorus attribute their excellence as singers to both divine and innate qualities. To persuade others is a gift from above that is still being bestowed, and the chorus at their age are still equal to the task of song. I make no pretense that the alleged corruption from μολπᾶι δ' ἄρκεῖ to μολπὰν ἀλκὰν has a simple and convincing explanation, though I do draw some comfort from τίς ἂν ἄρκέσειε . . . εἰπεῖν with a ὅπως-clause at Julian *Orationes* 1. 20C. All I wish to do is suggest that if there were a gap in the text at this point, the supplement I propose is not inferior to alternatives put forward in the past.⁵

4. N. Wecklein, ed., *Aeschyli Fabulae cum Lectionibus et Scholiis Codicis Medicei et in "Agamemnonem" Codicis Florentini ab Hieronymo Vitelli Denuo Collatis*, pars II: *Appendix Coniecturas Virorum Doctorum Minus Certas Continens* (Berlin, 1885), p. 144; R. D. Dawe, *Repertory of Conjectures on Aeschylus* (Leiden, 1965), p. 82.

5. That includes the recent past. I regret I can see no merit in such extraordinary interpretations as that of F. Solmsen, "SYMPHYTOS AION (A., Ag. 106)," *AJP* 100 (1979): 478: "What is it that 'still' (despite their old age) 'breathes down the persuasive power of songs'? It is the marrow, (αἰών), the seat and substance of their vitality. Though no better than in children (vv. 76–78), it has thanks to the gods this special strength." I do not believe in a marrow that breathes down from the gods. M. J. Smethurst, "The Authority of the Elders (The *Agamemnon* of Aeschylus)," *CP* 67 (1972): 89–93, who also dabbles in marrow (p. 92), wisely avoids translation. H. Lloyd-Jones, in *Dionysiaca: Nine Studies in Greek Poetry*, ed. R. D. Dawe, J. Diggle, and P. E. Easterling (Cambridge, 1978), p. 52, understands what σύμφυτος αἰών is but then writes what I would regard as impossible Greek: πεῖθω as object and μολπὰν ἀλκὰν in apposition.

Aeschylus *Agamemnon* 191:

βαρύ-
νοντ' Ἀχαικὸς λεῶς,
Χαλκίδος πέραν ἔχων παλιρρό-
χθοις ἐν Αὐλίδος τόποις.

In my juvenile work on Aeschylus I wrote that “πόροις would be an obvious suggestion to make for τόποις at *Agam.* 191.”⁶ I gave no arguments, and I do so now only because one of my Cambridge colleagues has paid me the mixed compliment of telling his lecture class that the emendation is right but the man who made it has no idea why. My reasons are twofold. First, the periphrasis involving τόποι with a genitive place-name is only used in the case of relatively large geographic areas: Hellas (*Aesch. Pers.* 796, *Supp.* 237); Libya (*Eum.* 292); the Peloponnese (*Eum.* 703); Salamis (*Pers.* 447). It is used of the vast mountain ranges of Ida (*Eur. frag.* 1085) or of Cithaeron (*Soph. OT* 1434). Aulis does not fall into this category.

The second reason is that the pictorial and sonorous adjective παλιρρόχθοις deserves a better noun to go with it than the colorless τόποις. Compare πόρους ἀλιρρόθους at *Persae* 367 and πόροι ἀλίρροθοι at Sophocles *Ajax* 412.

Finally, note the following places: Euripides *Iphigenia Aulidensis* 81 στενόπορ' Αὐλίδος βάθρα and 1496–97 Αὐλίδος στενοπόροις ἐν ὄρμοις; at 165 the chorus arrive at Aulis Εὐρίπου διὰ χειμάτων κέλσασα στενοπόρθμων. For the corruption, compare Euripides fragment 926, as well as the passages cited in my book.

Aeschylus *Agamemnon* 456:

βαρεῖα δ' ἄστων φάτις σὺν κότῳ

“Dangerous is the citizens’ talk, with anger in it”: so Fraenkel, who explains the σὺν as denoting an accompanying circumstance. Similarly, “accompanied by anger” is the translation given by Denniston and Page in their note. But the evidence of Sophocles *Oedipus Tyrannus* 17 οἱ δὲ σὺν γῆραι βαρεῖς, “weighed down with age,” suggests that βαρύς plus σὺν means quite simply what “heavy with” means in English. Aeschylus is saying not two things—that the citizens’ talk is (a) dangerous and (b) angry—but one: it is loaded with anger.

Aeschylus *Agamemnon* 545–48:

ΚΗ. ποθεῖν ποθοῦντα τήνδε γῆν στρατὸν λέγεις;
ΧΟ. ὥς πόλλ' ἁμαυρᾶς ἐκ φρενός <μ'> ἀναστέννει.
ΚΗ. πόθεν τὸ δύσφρον τοῦτ' ἐπὶν στύγος λεῶι;
ΧΟ. πάλαι τὸ σιγᾶν φάρμακον βλάβης ἔχω.

6. *Collation and Investigation of Manuscripts of Aeschylus* (Cambridge, 1964), p. 88.

546 <μ> Scaliger 547 λεῶι Heimsoeth: στρατῶι
codd.

The purpose of this note is not to restate the merits of Heimsoeth's λεῶι (to the examples I gave of this substitution in MSS on p. 11 of my *Collation and Investigation* add Soph. *Phil.* 1243). I wish instead to draw attention to the fact that the emotions of longing expressed in 545–46 cannot possibly be identical with the δύσφρον στύγος of 547. Στύγος at 558 below refers to various kinds of unpleasantness. At 1308 and *Choephoroi* 81 it is something repulsive, and “abomination” will do as a translation for *Septem* 653 and *Choephoroi* 532, 991, 1028. At *Choephoroi* 770, δεσπότης στύγει is “your loathsome master.” If the evidence of the noun is not enough, there is the evidence of the adjective: at 608 and *Choephoroi* 278 it is used of enemies; at *Agamemnon* 834 of the poison of envy; at *Supplices* 394 of an abhorrent marriage and at 511 of monsters. At *Persae* 552 and *Septem* 874 “ill-advised” would be a mild and charitable translation. Τὸ δύσφρον τοῦτο στύγος then is a very different kettle of fish from the sad longing for a departed army.

There is only one conclusion I can draw, namely, that at least two lines are missing between 546 and 547.⁷ The topic about which the chorus have to remain silent is the topic of the loathsome new regime, and there is nothing in 546 that provides the necessary springboard to launch us into this theme. If one were to make a guess at the contents of the lacuna, one might suggest that the Herald fastened onto the word ἀμαυρᾶς, which is perhaps not the most obvious word to use in the context. He may have asked: “Why do you say ἀμαυρᾶς? Was there anything else to upset you?” To this the chorus might have replied: “Yes, there was: we all felt a detestation for a superior power we could do nothing about.”

Aeschylus *Agamemnon* 611–12:

οὐκ οἶδα τέρπιν οὐδ' ἐπίσογον φάτιν
ἄλλου πρὸς ἀνδρὸς μᾶλλον ἢ χαλκοῦ βαφάς.

What is all this about the tempering of bronze? What could have presented this idea to the mind of Clytemnestra, or if you prefer, to the mind of Aeschylus? One overlooked clue may be found in the primitive belief that the tempering of metal was a union of water and fire, a kind of marriage. “La trempe d'une épée était considérée comme une union de l'eau et du feu. Le feu est le mâle de l'eau.”⁸ Clytemnestra is the woman who has “the fire lighted on my hearth” by Aegisthus (1435); Schneidewin's αἴθεσθαι at 592 would give us another such allusion. The

7. It has long been suspected that there is another lacuna in the vicinity (notwithstanding the defiant comment of Denniston and Page), after 561.

8. M. Granet, *Danses et légendes de la Chine ancienne*, Annales du Musée Guimet, Bibliothèque d'études 64 (Paris, 1959), p. 498. That steel and water also assist in the manufacture of murder-weapons is presumably not immediately relevant.

symbolism of the unbroken seal (609) with the verb that can be used of seduction and the double entendre of πύλας ἀνοίξαι (604) are enough to show that sexual themes are running through the Queen's mind all the time. Perhaps the choice of χαλκοῦ βαφάς is less odd than it looks if it too can be thought of as a kind of loss of chastity in the natural world. There is more work to be done yet on this problem passage, not least the finding of parallels more European and less Chinese. Where we start of course is with Sophocles *Ajax* 650–52:

κἀγὼ γάρ, ὅς τὰ δεῖν' ἐκαρτέρουν τότε,
βαφῇ σίδηρος ὥς ἐθελύνθην στόμα
πρὸς τῇσδε τῇς γυναικός·

I have, like others, punctuated this passage wrongly in my Teubner edition. The long process described in the imperfect ἐκαρτέρουν cannot be compared with the once-and-for-all immersion of iron into liquid. But neither can Ajax be saying that he has been softened by a process that everyone knew was designed to strengthen (cf. Hom. *Od.* 9. 391–93). The inference to be drawn is that Ajax is saying that he has lost his edge, that he has been “woman-ed”; a tacit comparison is drawn with the loss of an original male sexual drive following intercourse. “Unmanned” would be the nearest one-word English equivalent.

Aeschylus *Agamemnon* 615–16:

αὕτη μὲν οὕτως εἶπε μανθάνοντί σοι
τοροῖσιν ἑρμηνεύσιν εὐπρεπῇ λόγον.

616 εὐπρεπῇ Dorat: -ως codd.

Of the two dozen emendations of mine that Sir Denys Page was generous enough to mention in his Oxford Text this is perhaps the only one that calls (belatedly!) for a word or two of explanation. The proposal I made to him was:

αὕτη μὲν οὕτως εἶπεν—ἀνδάνοντά σοι,
τοροῖσι δ' ἑρμηνεύσι δυστερπῇ λόγον.

Only then did we discover that ἀνδάνοντα belonged to Bothe, as τοροῖσι δ' did to Metzger. The difficulties are lucidly set out in the commentary of Denniston and Page, and all I would wish to draw to the particular attention of the reader is the end of their first paragraph: “That if he reads between the lines he will observe that it is only a fair seeming speech?” They regard this as “unsuitably outspoken.” I would say rather that it is not spoken at all, because the vital word “only” does not appear. Εὐπρεπῆς passes from meaning “looking good” to “*looking* good” (*subaudi*: but not actually *being* good), that is, “specious.” But it cannot belong in a sentence with τοροῖσι ἑρμηνεύσι because you could never say “if you get to the bottom of her meaning you will find that it is specious, that it looks good.” “Only” is indispensable in such a context.

Fraenkel attempts to understand *μανθάνοντι* along the lines of the examples listed in Kühner-Gerth 1:424β (we could add a reference to 1:421(b): “in the eyes of some one”). The best method of rebuttal is to invite the reader to scrutinize those pages and then ask himself if he really believes that our dative immediately following falls into the same category. Equally incredible is the Greek involved in *μανθάνω* *τοποῖσιν* *ἐρμηνεύσιν*, and I share none of Fraenkel’s satisfaction over the alleged parallel of Euripides *Heraclidae* 390–92, where *ἀγγέλοισι* are given as an inadequate substitute for *ῥμμασι* for a general who wishes to assess the enemy. *Ἐρμηνεύσι* will hardly do for *δι’ ἐρμηνέων*.

For Bothe’s *ἀνδάνοντα* compare Euripides *Alcestis* 1108: *νίκα νυν· οὐ μὴν ἀνδάνοντά μοι ποιεῖς*. In *Agamemnon* 615, as in *Alcestis* 1108, I would take *ἀνδάνοντα* as a neuter plural, not as accusative singular anticipating *λόγον*. The hypothetical class of *τοποὶ ἐρμηνεῖς*, however, will see that any pleasure felt by Clytemnestra or her auditor is not real but of the *δυσ-* variety. Hence *δυστερπῇ*, an adjective that will recur at *Choephoroi* 277 and apparently nowhere else in Greek literature. It may be because the chorus are drawing attention to Clytemnestra’s duplicity that they use the abnormal phraseology (see Fraenkel) of *οὕτως εἶπεν*: not the usual “that is what she has said” but “this is the (hypocritical) manner in which she has spoken”; that is, she has spoken in a way that will engender in you the response of pleasure, but for those who can penetrate to her true meaning, as we flatter ourselves we can, it is a speech in which the expressions of pleasure are really those of displeasure. The dative *τοποῖσι ἐρμηνεῦσι* is of course not governed by *δυστερπῇ* but is of the “nach dem Urteile, in den Augen jemandes”-type discussed in Kühner-Gerth 1:421. For the confusion of *ευ-* and *δυσ-*, *Choephoroi* 704 is evidence, if Heimsoeth is right, as Wilamowitz, Murray, and Groeneboom agree he is; Heath’s emendation at *Eumenides* 910 is less popular, and at Sophocles *Ajax* 420 Erfurd’s *δύσφρονες* for *εὐφρονες* has long been forgotten (and was indeed repudiated by its proposer). Dodds is suspicious of Reiske’s *δυσσεβείας* for *εὐσεβείας* (*ἀσεβείας* *Christ. Pat.*) at Euripides *Bacchae* 263, but Brodeau’s *ἐκ δυσσεβείας* for *ἐξ εὐ-* looks certain at *Helena* 1021.

Aeschylus *Agamemnon* 1268:

ἄλλην τιν’ ἄτης ἀντ’ ἐμοῦ πλουτίζετε

ἄτης Stanley: ἄτην codd.

There is a nuance here that the commentators have missed. *Πλουτίζετε* means “enrich,” but *ἄτη*, apart from its more familiar meanings, can denote financial loss (I listed some instances in *HSCP* 72 [1968]: 98–99). The oxymoron here is more oxy- and less -moron than has usually been supposed and goes beyond (e.g.) *Oedipus Tyrannus* 30 “*Αἰδης στεναγμοῖς καὶ γόοις πλουτίζεται*.” I am not of course suggesting that Cassandra is thinking in monetary terms, like the islanders who were

“possessed of Poverty and Helplessness” at Herodotus 8. 111. 3, but simply that her language has a more specific pungency than we might have imagined.

Aeschylus *Agamemnon* 1535–36:

Δίκα δ' ἐπ' ἄλλο πρᾶγμα θήγεται βλάβας
πρὸς ἄλλαις θηγάναισι Μοίρας.

So runs the Oxford text, though as his apparatus shows, Page was anything but certain about it. I have nothing to contribute to the major problems, and ask a question that some may consider frivolous: how many whetstones did Moira have, and do we need to move from one to another as we sharpen something for a fresh deed of blood? Does “otherness” require, in the context, this degree of emphasis? “You treat Aesch. as if he were Aristotle” was Page’s comment on the proposal I now make; but I make it just the same for the benefit of any other desiccated logicians who may read *Agamemnon*: for ἄλλαις read αἰναῖς. Moira’s whetstone can now look those of *Eumenides* 859 (αἱματηράς) and Sophocles *Ajax* 820 (σιδηροβρῶτι) in the face.

Aeschylus *Eumenides* 935–37:

σιγῶν <δ'> ὄλεθρος
καὶ μέγα φωνοῦντ'
ἐχθραῖς ὀργαῖς ἀμαθύνει.
935 <δ'> Musgrave

Anyone who offends the Eumenides (931–32) will not know what hit him: οὐκ οἶδεν ὅθεν πληγαὶ βιότου. Destruction silently pulverizes even those with the loudest mouths. But does ὄλεθρος really get angry? Is it ever personified enough for it to be actuated by human or the pettier Olympian passions? If it is, ought it to be angry as it dispenses justice in silence? What I would expect to see here is the word with which ὀργή is constantly confused, ὀρμή, a word that can, for those who want it, encompass much of the emotional drive of ὀργή, but that better fits the imagery of a destructive force reducing something to dust: ἐχθραῖς ὀρμαῖς is an exact counterpart to the ἐπισσύτους βίου τύχας ὀνησίμους just celebrated at 924 and maintains the idea of πληγαί. Compare the similar thinking that underlies ἐφόδοις at 370.

I come now to one or two alterations made in the second edition of my Teubner text of Sophocles.

Sophocles *Ajax* 421–26:

οὐκέτ' ἄνδρα μὴ
τόνδ' ἴδῃτ', ἔπος
ἐξερῶ μέγ', οἶον οὔτινα Τροία στρατοῦ
δέρχθῃ. . . .

The problem is a purely technical one. The final syllable of οὔτινα has to be long to give the necessary last syllable of an iambic metron. Can it lengthen before the initial mute plus liquid of Τροία? A convenient place to find the possible evidence assembled is Barrett's note on Euripides *Hippolytus* 760 (see also his "Addenda," p. 435). The majority of these cases involve prepositives, constituting therefore cases of lengthening within the same word-complex, a practice no one has ever challenged. The remainder are a very depressing bunch indeed, and we need not add to them. Barrett rightly rejects Gleditsch's solution of writing οὔτιν' ἅ Τροία: the article would be unidiomatic in this lyric style;⁹ ἀνὰ τὰν εὐρώδῃ Τροίαν (1190) is acknowledged to be corrupt. I have therefore assumed that we have here an instance of synonym substitution, facilitated perhaps by the similarity of letters in (οὐτ)ιν ιλι(ον). If one looks at facsimile 47 in the collection of Cavalieri and Lietzmann,¹⁰ of a Triclinian manuscript dated to 1495, one may see the gloss Τρωϊκὴ poised threateningly over Ἰλιάς at Euripides *Hecuba* 905. At *Troades* 704, Ἰλιον has been rather unexpectedly extruded by a gloss on πάλιν in V, and the corruptions at Aeschylus *Eumenides* 457 and Euripides *Rhesus* 912 may both owe something to synonym substitution.

An alternative proposal was mentioned to me by Mr. J. A. Gruys years ago: take advantage of the corruption in the strophe to print ἐξερῶ μέγα and οἶον οὔτινα as hypodochmiacs in periods of their own, like 402, 403, 423 (*brevis in longo*) and 404, 419 (*hiatus*).

Sophocles *Philoctetes* 696–700:

οὐδ' ὃς θερμοτάταν αἰμάδα κηκιομέναν ἐλκέων
ἐνθήρου ποδὸς ἥπιοισι φύλλοις
κατευνάσειεν εἴ τις ἐμπέσοι (desunt duae syllabae)
φορβάδος ἔκ τι γὰρ ἐλών.

700 τι Hartung: τε codd. ἐλών de Tournebou:
ἐλεῖν codd.

This crux was discussed by J. Jackson (*Marginalia Scaenica* [Oxford, 1955], pp. 112–13), who proposed εἴ τις ἐμπέσοι <πόθος>, retaining ἐλεῖν. But a desire for a cure does not "fall on" a man suffering pain; it is a natural concomitant of that pain. Nor does a αἰμάς bubbling up from a wound "fall on" him. Any supplement must be compatible with the nuance of the verb: see in particular LSJ, s.v. ἐμπίπτω 3a, and compare *Trachiniae* 1253–54 πρὶν ἐμπεσεῖν / σπαραγμόν. That is the sort of noun we need here, or rather something to denote a fit or seizure. Either σεισμός or σπασμός would suit, the former having a slight paleographic advantage if it follows -ειεν and precedes εἴ τις; for its use with reference to the body, see LSJ s.v. 2.

9. It has intruded again at Eur. *IT* 442 [τὰν] Τρωϊάδα λιποῦσα πόλιν.

10. P. Franchi de' Cavalieri and J. Lietzmann, *Specimina Codicum Graecorum Vaticanorum* (Bonn, 1910).

Sophocles *Philoctetes* 1153–55:

ἀλλ' ἀνέδην ὅδε χῶρος ἐρύκεται
οὐκέτι φοβητὸς ὑμῖν
ἔρπετε·

Philoctetes has addressed the birds and wild animals who haunt the spot where he lives and who will no longer have to flee from him now that he has been robbed of his bow and arrows. Our point of departure should be ἀνέδην. This rare adverb, as the examples in LSJ show, must go with the verb of motion ἔρπετε and not with the stationary and unexcited ἐρύκεται. But if so, we have a jerky sentence interpolated, more in the manner of a modern journalist than an ancient poet, between adverb and verb. “But freely—this place is guarded no longer so as to be fearful to you—go on your way.” Writing ὁ δὲ χῶρος (“for this place . . .”) is an *Auskunftsmittel* that helps only slightly. I confess to finding the word order ὅδε χῶρος ἐρύκεται οὐκέτι φοβητὸς somewhat unattractive. In any event “this place” was not an object of fear at 1147–48, when Philoctetes still had his bow, only the immediate vicinity of the αὔλια. In my first edition I accepted Porson’s χωλός. I should not have done so, for Philoctetes’ lameness has been with him all the time he has been on the island, and he should now be talking about the new factor that means that the birds and animals need no longer feel φόβος. True, one could say “the lame man is kept from you, no longer an object of fear,” but again one may feel that “the lame man” is more the expression of a modern journalist. Headlam’s χωρίς was an important step forward, underlining the crucial point that Philoctetes cannot from now on make (hostile) contact with his prey. But if we do no more than put it into the text, we shall still have our jerky interpolated sentence; and the escape provided by ὁ δὲ is now closed to us, since it will be necessary to have ὅδε as “this man,” that is, “I.” But if we replace ὅδε with ὅτε, we have a regular subordinate clause, halfway in meaning between “when” and “since.” Once that ὅτε had become altered to ὅδε (doubtless under the influence of the prior corruption of χωρίς to χῶρος), the first-person verb ἐρύκομαι that I have printed would be a necessary scribal correction:

ἀλλ' ἀνέδην, ὅτε χωρίς ἐρύκομαι
οὐκέτι φοβητὸς ὑμῖν,
ἔρπετε·

Sophocles *Philoctetes* 1265–66:

ὅμοι· κακὸν τὸ χρῆμα· μὴν τί μοι μέγα
πάρεστε πρὸς κακοῖσι πέμποντες κακόν;

Page’s obviously correct ὅμοι κακῶν· τί χρῆμα must, one might have thought, have been anticipated by F. Chrestien in his sixteenth-century edition of the play; for in the margin the word κακῶν is written accompanied by Chrestien’s initials, and it is difficult to believe he can have

thought his way through to this without also seeing that the following τὸ and the punctuation would also have to be altered. But the line needs further attention. Philoctetes cannot be saying “are you [or “surely you are not”] sending some great misfortune in my direction?” He can hardly expect a benevolent act from them, and the natural implication of his question is that he regards the previous injury done him as not μέγα, which all the evidence of the play contradicts. Hence Schneidewin’s νέον: “are you sending some new misfortune in my direction?” The sense is perfect, but the alleged corruption much less easy to believe in than if we smuggle in the “new” sense by the back door, writing μέγ’ αὖ with that run-on between lines that is such a feature of Sophoclean style. For the corruption, compare (e.g.) *Ajax* 1088, where μέγα stands for μέγ’ αὖ in codices GQD, or τίνα in the manuscripts for the widely accepted τίν’ αὖ at *Antigone* 1289. Αὖ is particularly appropriate in the present context both because it often goes with expressions of surprise and because here the putative injury is a second one. The parallel with Euripides *Heraclidae* 646–48 is very striking:

τί χρῆμ’ αὐτῆς πᾶν τόδ’ ἐπλήσθη στέγος,
 Ἰόλαε; μῶν τίς σ’ αὖ βιάζεται παρῶν
 κῆρυξ ἀπ’ Ἀργούς;

Shared features are the noise that brings the person out of his dwelling, the phrase τί χρῆμ’, the use of μῶν to introduce a question about a feared injury, and, if I am right, αὖ in both places.

Sophocles *Oedipus Coloneus* 121–22:

λεύσσαι’ αὐτόν, προσδέρκου, προσφθέγγου,
 προσπεύθου πανταχῇ.
 προσφθέγγου AUY: om. tell. προσπεύθου
 om. AUY: habent tell.

Λεύσσαι’ is plural, and we need a singular; even more important, it gives the wrong sense. Λεύσσω means “look at” (which is impossible here because the whole point is that Oedipus is nowhere to be seen), not “look for.” There is all the difference in the world between *cherchez la femme* and *regardez la femme*, and the same goes for *les hommes*, too. The evidence of the manuscripts suggests that we do not have to jettison one of the trio of imperatives of verbs of seeing, speaking, and more generally making enquiries. Manuscripts AUY had no motive to interpolate προσφθέγγου, and the chances of haplography are obviously great in this region. We certainly do not want two expressions of seeing, one of them inapposite, at the cost of abandoning either προσφθέγγου or προσπεύθου. The problem seems to solve itself: eliminate λεύσσαι’ αὐτόν, the element that is unmetrical, anomalous in number, and wrong in sense. If it is objected that λεύσσαι’ is not a word that might have replaced a genuine piece of poetic text, first consult the apparatus at Euripides *Iphigenia Aulidensis* 1219.

Sophocles *Oedipus Coloneus* 1751–54:

παύετε θρῆνον, παῖδες· ἐν οἷς γὰρ
 χάρις ἢ χθονία ξυναπόκειται
 πενθεῖν οὐ χρή· νέμεσις γάρ.

χρονία θεῶν ἅπο χεῖται scripsimus

Theseus is giving the children a reason for crying no longer, and he gives it in the form of a general maxim. How general can a maxim be that refers to the (one might think) rather irregular occurrence of persons being turned into chthonic heroes for the public good, or whatever the incredible Greek of ξύν' ἀπόκειται (Reisig) and its competitors is supposed to mean? *Oedipus Coloneus* is much concerned with burial, chthonic deities, and so forth, and the replacement of an original χρονία by χθονία in manuscripts is even less difficult than it might be elsewhere. The two words have already been confused once in this play, at 948, as Bergk and Page both saw. The phrase χάρις ἢ χθονία, "the earthy" grace, as opposed to other χάριτες—for such is the force of the article—would be a very fair way of describing Antigone sprinkling dust on the corpse of Polynices, as opposed to other charitable actions, but it is less obviously right as denoting the recent fate of Oedipus. We may feel, too, that the phrase νέμεσις γάρ is so brief that it requires something to pave the way to it. Is χθονία enough to mean not simply "relating to the ground" (as in burial) but also "relating to the underworld deities"? Even if it is, is such a subject ever going to consort well with ἀπόκειται?

The phrase I have proposed, χάρις ἢ χρονία, can have two meanings. Its primary meaning is "death," the χάρις that has the property of lasting forever. A comparable expression occurs at Euripides *Helena* 343–44 ἢ 'ν νέκυσι κατὰ χθονὸς / τὰν χρόνιον ἔχει τύχαν, where again the corruption to χθόνιον has happened.¹¹

Now to the second half of the line. Let us remember the conditions our phrase has to meet: (a) it must embody a verb that suits χάρις; (b) it must if possible make it clear by whom the νέμεσις of 1752 will be felt; (c) its tone must be one of comfort, because it gives the reason why the children should stop sobbing; (d) it must give a long syllable where ξυν now stands. In my proposal, θεῶν ἅπο χεῖται, the verb χεῖται will surprise no one. It is the standard Greek verb for the shedding of grace on someone by the gods: Homer *Odyssey* 2. 12 will stand as a *Musterbeispiel*. When it came, Oedipus shielded his eyes against it (1650–51). Grace shed by Olympians is a more comforting thought than earthy privileges safeguarded by chthonic deities, and that is why Theseus is dwelling on this aspect of affairs now.¹²

11. It is with dismay that I see Kannicht defending χθόνιον. His contention that χρόνιος is only used predicatively in tragedy founders on *OC* 948 in the eyes of those who accept Bergk's and Page's emendation there.

12. If Sophocles had chosen to express "death" more literally, χεῶ would still have been a legitimate word to use: cf. Hom. *Il.* 13. 544.

It is only θεῶν that does not have an obvious paleographical explanation. It is useless to pretend that θεῶν and ξυν look like each other; but a θεῶν written in the regular form of the abbreviated *nomen sacrum*, θῶν, is not so different from a ξυν written in the form in which it appears in manuscripts ZnZoT, συν. There is no gap here that cannot be bridged with a little goodwill.

Eubulus fragment 115

How much better it is to bring up a human than a goose

ἢ στρουθον ἢ πίθηκον, ἐπίβουλον κακόν.

“Always plotting mischief” is how the Loeb translates, and there can be little doubt that this is right. But the Greek for this is surely ἐπίβουλον κακῶν: ἐπίβουλον κακόν would mean either “a nasty plotter” or “a plotting nasty thing.” Of course it is true that κακόν can be used substantively with an accompanying adjective, but the question before us is whether the speaker wishes to condemn outright: nobody would wish to bring up a monkey, which is notoriously a scheming nuisance; or whether he is giving the reason why one should not wish to bring up a monkey: they are always up to no good. I much prefer the latter. For the genitive, see Kühner-Gerth 1:369.

Trinity College,
Cambridge